The proceeding articles to this series are as follows –
COMMUNISTS SUPPORT PAKISTAN
Islamic Communism
After the 1937 provincial elections, Muslim separatism assumed a concrete shape. Muslim League’s 1938 Patna session had attacked the INC, with Jinnah accusing the Congress of systematically destroying Muslim culture wherever it formed the government. In March 1939, Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s lieutenant, voiced the view that British India could be divided “in a suitable manner” if “Hindus and Moslems cannot live amicably in any other way.” (1)
Extremist Anti-Congress slogans enhanced the League’s standing beyond its traditional upper-class constituency. Its position further improved after the outbreak of the war, when it told the government its readiness to maintain peace and stability if Muslim demands were met. Viceroy Linlithgow declared that “full weight would be given to [the Muslims’] views and interests”. (2)
With the British promise and the Congress’s refusal to negotiate on his terms Jinnah pushed ahead by expounding the “two-nation-theory” at the League’s Lahore session in March 1940: “It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority [….] . The Musalmans are not a minority. The Musalmans are a nation by any definition.” (3) The resolution demanded the constitution of “geographically contiguous units” to be “demarcated into regions which should be so constituted […] that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign”. (4)
Jinnah called on Muslims to organise “as servants of Islam,” had reiterated the importance of Islamic law back at Patna, and exhorted them to “observe Islamic simplicity on all social occasions, and to abandon all un-Islamic ceremonies and customs.” The articulation of religious identity in national terms connected to the CPI’s united front line. as an issue of “national minorities.”
1938 Muslim League session at Patna

INC refused to take Jinnah and the Muslim League seriously— Nehru deemed the communal cleavage “a side issue [that] can have no real meaning in the larger scheme of things.” During the war, the League, formed ministries in several provinces where INC-led governments had resigned and kept on winning by-elections for Muslim seats.

The final opportunity that completed the transformation in the communist perception of communalism was provided by the change in the evaluation of WWII after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Capitalising on Linlithgow’s “tactless obstinacy [sic!]” (5) of slighting the Congress upon bringing India into the war, the CPI criticised the INC’s initial line of extending moderate support to the war effort even while its provincial ministries had resigned in protest. The confirmation of the Congress position in the March 1940 Ramgarh resolution met with resistance from the communists, who called for an immediate mass upheaval against British rule. Ramgarh initiated a period of repression of the CPI under the Defense of India Rules. (6)

In the wake of the 1941 Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the Comintern now called on its affiliate parties to help increase the war production of the Allies. Under pressure from both the Comintern and its ‘mentor,’ the CPGB, the CPI could not maintain its anti-war stance for long. (7)

Thus the Politburo’s December 1941 resolution heralded a phase of communist efforts to maintain political and industrial peace, for which the CPI was rewarded with legalisation in July 1942. The party’s commitment was now unequivocal: The war had become a “people’s war” against fascism. National unity was the need of the hour; the CPI exhorted Congress to resume the provincial ministries and form a united front with the League. Muslim communalism got rebranded as ‘Muslim nationalism’.

The release of communist cadres in May 1942 and the party’s legalisation two months later enhanced its scope for political activism. Communist fortunes profited from the INC’s disappearance from the political scene for the remainder of the war after its ban following the August 1942 “Quit India” resolution. The communists opposed the Quit India movement, claiming that the campaign was “not a struggle for National Government or for freedom. It is a provocative attempt by the bureaucracy to plunge the country into an orgy violence, lawlessness, and anarchy.” (8)

Officially enacted in September 1942, the new line had already been laid down during illegality. An October 1940 conference of leftist students imagined independent India as a “voluntary association of regional states.” (9) The October 1941 Party Letter envisaged that in a free India, all nationalities (15 were explicitly mentioned, among them Tamils, Oriyas, Gujaratis, and Western and Eastern Punjabis) were to be guaranteed equal linguistic, cultural, educational, and educative rights. The subcontinent was going through a process of awakening of nationalities; this was “the essence of the communal problem in its new form.” (10)  The document ostracised the “reactionary leadership of the minority nationalities” for demanding “separation based on religion” as in the campaigns for Pakistan and, interestingly, Dravidistan, expounded by Periyar E V Ramaswamy Naicker. The CPI envisaged granting “free and independent development” to every nationality. (11)

The need for broad-based national unity under the “people’s war” line rendered the ML an indispensable ally of the communists from 1942 onwards: The call for unity of INC and ML— not of Hindus and Muslims— became the CPI’s slogan until the end of the war. The League’s demands were to be met to form a sustained national coalition to achieve it. (12)

The Muslim League was the only organisation other than the CPI voicing the aspirations of Muslim’ nationalities.’ By spring 1942, the ML was well on its way to being elevated into the Muslim counterpart of the Congress when General Secretary P. C. Joshi called for the formation of Congress-League coalition ministries in the provinces. They would symbolise Hindu-Muslim unity and, of all things, defeat the “communal reactionaries who disturb communal harmony.” (13)  It would be “wrong and unrealistic [!]” to dismiss the League, the “political organisation of the second largest community in our country […] as a ‘reactionary, communal organisation’.” (14)

Gandhi had given up the idea of a settlement before independence, reasoning that unity would not proceed but follow the nation’s freedom. Gandhi’s resignation was now considered an “admission of bankruptcy, […] a complete lack of faith in the people and their healthy patriotic instincts” by Ganghadar Moreshwar Adhikari, the architect of the CPI’s ‘nationality line.’ (15)

G Adhikari, the Politburo member, welcomed Pakistan in a thesis titled Pakistan and Indian National Unity, released by the CPI in 1943, was inspired by Joseph Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question as it stressed the importance of nationality to share a common language, a defined territory and shared national consciousness. Adhikari’s Pakistan thesis was the speech, On the Present National Questions in India, at an Enlarged Central Committee meeting of the Communist Party of India, held in September 1942. It was published in Labour. (16)

Adhikari began by saying, “old ways of looking at the problem, old solutions, still persist in our understanding, and quite naturally so. These tendencies, these outmoded ways of thinking, which really form the deviations of today, have to be brought out and nailed down sharply, not only in terms of principles but also in terms of historical evolution. Otherwise, they cannot be rooted out”. He said, “in the first and earliest period, it was the fundamental axiom of the national movement (which was itself in its earliest period) that India is one nation; the difference between the Hindus and the Muslims is only one of religion…. in our own country, the problem of unifying the different sections of our people against imperialism, for the war of liberation against Fascism arises at a time when the spread of the national movement has aroused various dormant nationalities of our land to life when new “national” urges are beginning to appear under this impact. Unless we recognise this fact, we cannot find the key to unity today. It is when we examine the present period that the full force of Stalin’s remark comes out before us: In the case of India, too, it is probable that he found that innumerable nationalities, till then lying dormant, would come to life with the further course of bourgeois development.

“Our policy has to be sharply and clearly demarcated from (1) the stand of Jinnah and the separatists; (2) the stand of the National Congress leadership; (3) the stand of the Akhanda Hindustan-wallas ….”

In sharp contrast to established communist tradition, he came round to acknowledge that regionally, ethnically, and religiously divisive ideologies were part of the prospective revolutionary subject’s political self-assertion: “It is often stated that the masses have no communalism [….] But in actual practice, as the general national anti-imperialist upsurge spreads deeper into the masses, it finds an echo in the growing up of sectional, communal, and provincial patriotism.” However, this manifestation was a mere appearance, “a distorted expression of an otherwise healthy growth, viz. the masses of the individual nationalities awakening to an all-India anti-imperialist national consciousness.”

Adhikari identified two fundamentally different issues: While the ever-greedy bourgeoisie had merely been divided by growing competition for jobs and had devised communalism as a means of struggle, the spread of the national movement had politicised even the “peasant masses of the most backward nationalities and communities,” rendering the movement for independence a “rich pattern of a multinational movement.” For theoretical support, Adhikari referred back to a 1925 speech by Stalin that had predicted the emergence of a plethora of hitherto unidentified national communities in the event of a “‘revolutionary upheaval’ in India.”

Therefore, the extension of equal support to Congress and League transcended political imperatives of “people’s war” in that it corresponded to sociological parallels: The League was “to the Muslim petty-bourgeois mass what the Indian National Congress is to the Indian masses in general.” Since both embodied the political expression of the same social forces, their aspirations had to be on the same footing:

To the Muslim masses, therefore, it appears that the Muslim League leadership is fighting not only for the complete independence of India from the imperialist rule but also for freedom and equality to territorial units which are predominantly Muslim and for the protection of the rights of Muslim minorities in other provinces about culture, education and language. Thus the rise of the Muslim League influence cannot be regarded as a reactionary phenomenon.

Therefore, Adhikari rejected that religious differences, or “irrational, obscurantist and fanatical elements” among Muslims, were responsible for the deadlock between Congress and League. Instead, a perception of the League leadership as bourgeois and of its role towards imperialism as “somewhat analogous” to the one of the Congress would allow for a “very simple solution to the communal problem in its new phase [….] “We must put before each Muslim nationalist a picture of free life [!] in his homeland, in the land of his forefathers, among his fellow-nationalists.”

Thus, the awakening community consciousness among the subcontinent’s Muslim population was not a sign of its backwardness but of its avant-garde position, which could be welded into a “firm anti-imperialist unity” with likewise developments in other communities. (17)

Adhikari’s concession that Muslims had participated in the khilafat movement primarily due to the “religious pull,” and that on a general plane it had not been “the concrete democratic demands of the masses that united them in the [non- cooperation and khilafat] struggle, but [religious] demands of the leaders” entailed dismissing as the “vulgar economic way” the classical communist view of the matter. (18) The spread of nationalism to the peasantry then had “necessarily” obsolesced overarching unity. Muslims demanded “full and unfettered political and economic existence,” into his reassurance to Muslim communities that there would be guarantees for their “cultural rights.” (19)  Consequently, the resolution On Pakistan And National Unity passed at the plenum of the enlarged Central Committee in September 1942 and confirmed at 1943 first-party Congress, declared that the “basic rights of the communities and [!] nationalities must be an essential part of the united national front”: (20)

Then it had this absurd line: Every section of the Indian people which has a contiguous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, everyday language, culture, psychological make-up and ordinary economic life would be recognised as a distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian union or federation and will have the right secede from it if it may so desire. (21)

Ranadive, Adhikari and Joshi, PB meet, Mumbai, 1945

He finished by saying, “in the Soviet Union, after the revolution itself, many nationalities attained full-fledged nationhood over time. Hence, we steadily keep before ourselves the two criteria: (1) the grant of the right of separation dispels distrust and creates unity here and now. (2) We should demarcate the nationalities so that in a free and democratic India, the nationalities will grow and flower, and will develop towards Socialism”.

In his report to 1943 first party Congress in Bombay, Adhikari reiterated the core principle at work by averring that “to ignore this pride and love [for one’s own culture and language], this aspiration, of the various sections of our people, to brush them aside saying these are provincial prejudices or communal demands, is to ignore a growing reality.” (22)

Adhikari insisted that the self-determination of nationalities be looked upon as a “political revolutionary question, not a constitutional question.” In other words, the communists viewed the right of separation as the most potent “unifying bond.”

In 1948, long after the end of the CPI’s ‘nationality period,’ the Soviet journal Bolshevik endorsed the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims against the Hindu maharaja because they were “an oppressed nation in their own country.” (23)

The Indian Party’s commitment underwent a qualitative change around 1943 when the task to expound the position on Pakistan and self-determination passed from Adhikari to Sajjad Zaheer, the most outstanding Muslim intellectual in the party. (24)  It was under his guidance that the acculturation of communism to Islam reached its zenith. Zaheer expanded Adhikari’s approach by clarifying the communist stance on Pakistan—the “demand for self-determination” of which was “a just, progressive and national demand,” and even “the positive expression of […] freedom and democracy.” (25)  He channelled this unequivocal political commitment into a comprehensive turn towards Muslim culture and religion. Along with General Secretary Joshi, Zaheer went about to rethink and overhaul traditional political and social obligations by fashioning the communist course of action in analogy to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’, although both were ignorant of it. Gramsci had polemicised that communists could not achieve victory in advanced capitalist societies by clinging to the “fatalism” and “economism” of Marxist historical materialism. Unable to revolutionise society through a quick strike in a “war of maneuver,” they needed to entrench themselves in civil society and conduct a “war of position.” (26)  While for Gramsci, the non-economic revolutionary subject had been the proletariat, in India, the only eligible segment was the ‘masses.’ Their politicisation along communal lines manifested itself in political demands and the direct religious-cultural accommodation. Zaheer’s task consisted in growing “the seed of a genuine urge” recognised by Adhikari. (27)

Zaheer traced the ML’s demand for separate representation to the ever “backward and undeveloped” condition of the Muslim community as a whole. (28)  In the khilafat movement, “the Muslims” had fought, “though in a vague and still undefined manner, for the freedom of the Muslim peoples.” Zaheer went a step further by connecting past political assertions of Muslims directly to the millenarian goal of national freedom. He concluded that the “progress of the Muslims and the Muslim League, from separate electorates […] to self-determination and Pakistan, is […] the growing expression of the various stages of national, democratic and anti-imperialist urge” of India’s “Muslim peoples.” (29)

Under the auspices of the East Pakistan Renaissance Society, an inter-party meeting including Congressites, Leaguers, and communists was held at Calcutta to debate the question of Pakistan in September 1943. Muzaffar Ahmad’s “most inspiring contribution” unequivocally extolled “the old and brave fights waged and led by Muslims against imperialism, their sacrifice, courage, suffering in the Wahabi, Moplah and Khilafat movements and called on those present to live up to these traditions.” (30)

Zaheer cemented the link between Muslim identity and anti-imperialist resistance by considering the execution of their subversive national destiny a duty of all Muslims worth their salt. Commemorating the passing of the Pakistan resolution, Zaheer decreed that “the slogan of Pakistan is as dear to the heart of a Muslim, like that of Swaraj to those under Congress influence.” 668 In July 1943, People’s War printed a statement of ML leader Liaqat Ali Khan commending the CPI for “trying to convince the Hindu masses of the justness of the Muslim demand of Pakistan” and hoping that it would succeed in converting “the Hindus” to their views. (31)

The earlier Muslim apprehensions of the CPI as a Hindu party were not unfounded. The first post-legalisation Party Letter had contained a questionnaire intended to apprise the upper echelons about the local units’ activities and composition. Muslims also were a category of interest. Only five per cent of party members were Muslim—even less than in the INC. (32)

On the occasion of the League’s Karachi session in December 1943, the CPI asserted that Muslims had “every right to demand” from the League, “based on the very Islamic traditions of which you are rightly [!] proud,” that “rich and poor be treated alike.” (33)  In the runner-up to the 1944 talks between Gandhi and Jinnah, Joshi averred that the acceptance of Pakistan would make India more potent, as independent and robust Muslim states on the frontiers would constitute its “best defence.” (34)

In mid-1943, People’s War made concrete plans for an Urdu edition of the paper to meet the needs of the “Muslim patriots”; in 1944, it introduced a weekly rubric, Muslim World, under which news items from Muslim politics and culture were published for the better part of the ensuing two years. (35) People’s War itself turned towards promoting Muslim culture. The editorial of the September 17, 1944 issue consisted of a poem-pledge vowing to build “a new heaven in a new India” under the heading “I’D Mubarak.” The pictures of Muslims in traditional attire with hilarious captions were printed with the article. The poem’s author was Kaifi Azmi, with strong left leanings to convey the paper’s Eid greetings to its Muslim readers. He wrote of the “Crescent” that would soon rise over the “minarets of Victory and Liberty” and looked forward to the celebration of next year’s Eid in Pakistan, a “land of good omen.” (36)

The communists participated at the 1944 Pakistan Day celebrations, conveyed fraternal greetings at rallies, and even staged them on their own: The CPI’s Bombay unit, not satisfied with the ML’s efforts, organised several gatherings on Pakistan Day, inviting veterans of the khilafat movement, and called on the audience to buy Muslim League flags from League volunteers at the venue. (37)

Rajani Palme Dutt

The communist All-India Student Federation’s (AISF) Punjab section allied with the League’s student wing, the Muslim Student Federation (MSF). To provide food relief for famine-stricken Bengal, both bodies had edged closer in 1944, which had required “utmost tact” on the part of the AISF. However, its leadership exceeded its measure of discreteness when it struck a secret deal with the MSF in November 1944, recognising it as the sole representative of Muslim students and being recognised vice versa as the sole representative of “nationalist” ones. This caused uproar in the AISF and the parent party because of both excessive secrecy and the implied unconditional support for Pakistan—which, however, was considered problematic only insofar as it would alienate many Hindu students. (38)

On the occasion of the Mappila rebellion’s upcoming 25th anniversary, P. C. Joshi paid tribute to the courage and determination of the 1921 rebels during a tour in Malabar in March 1946. (39)  A couple of months later, EMS Namboodiripad authored a commemorating article in Deshabhimani, the Malayalam communist organ: The CPI remembered “wholeheartedly and respectfully the great bravery and revolutionary skill” of the insurgents, who had risen against the “Satanic rule” (!) of the British. EMS reserved his “utter endless disgust” for the reprisals during the British counter-insurgency campaign, which could be compared to only “the bestiality of fascism.” The Congress’s allegation of religious fanaticism had been motivated by cowardice and the desire to stay aloof. (40) While EMS had remained silent on the motives or deeds of the rebels, his general secretary Joshi filled the gap: The “Moplah peasants of Malabar, rising spontaneously against the landlord and imperialist oppression battled fearlessly showing marvels of heroism, capacity for struggle and sacrifice.” (41) Nevertheless, the rebellion ought to be called not “Moplah rebellion,” but “Malabar rebellion,” since “the glories of 1921 were not the property of the Moplahs alone but of the district.” All Keralites ought to study the “historical lessons” of the great struggle.

The communist line shifted perceptibly when the Ahrars joined an antiLeague (that held the ministry) block in Bengal in early 1944.: They preferred Fascist powers to colonial rule, and instead of supporting the League’s demand for self-determination, they advocated an obscure “divine kingdom.” (42)  Things became worse when Ahrar leader Hafiz Ali Bahadur Khan labelled the League “unIslamic.” Determined to ward off such allegations, People’s War responded by accusing the Ahrars of themselves betraying their vision of a “divine kingdom of Islam.” In addition, the paper assuagingly printed statements from high-ranking Muslim Leaguers denying their stance being un-Islamic by referring to rulings of the ulema. (43)  This episode closed the Ahrar chapter for the CPI.

Considerations of pro-League loyalty dominated even the CPI’s reactions to the most glaring administrative outage of the League during the Second World War: The Bengal ministry’s failure to implement effective anti-famine measures as the disaster unfolded from summer 1943 onwards. (44)  B. T. Ranadive commented that the League ministry’s inability to provide relief to the “death-stricken sons of Bengal” was even less comprehensible because of the “millions of Muslims” affected. (45)

In 1946, when communal tensions were building up to a dangerous level, a serious challenge to the CPI’s approach to the ‘nationality question’ emerged. It emanated not from party ranks but from CPGB theoretician Rajani Palme Dutt. Alarmed by a bitter letter from Nehru complaining that the communists had become “full-blooded supporters of Jinnah’s demands,” Dutt came out in 1946 to accuse Jinnah of pursuing “a reactionary obstructive tactic which plays into the hands of imperialism to […] prevent a democratic solution of the Indian question.” (46)

Dutt himself subscribed to the “genuine national”—not just anti-imperialist—”content concealed behind the Pakistan demand.” (47) His dismissal of the League’s separatist campaign as “basically opposed to the programme of national self-determination” directly challenged Zaheer’s appraisal.

His intervention caused an uproar among Indian communists. The CPI’s reply that Dutt had overemphasised both the ML’s “communal and un-democratic aspect” and ignored that the “freedom-loving Muslims are behind the League” on the one hand illustrated the party’s firm commitment. On the other, it preached to the converted: Dutt himself agreed that the League was the “main freedom organisation of the Muslims.” (48)  Accordingly, he identified “strong popular democratic currents” within its fold following the ML’s sweep of the 1946 polls in which it won 76 per cent of the Muslim vote and almost 90 per cent of the Muslim seats. (49)  And eventually, Dutt demonstrated his own consonance with the CPI’s nationality concept by admitting the “multinational character of the Indian people,” which made for significant differences between “a Pathan, a Bengali and a Sikh [!].” (50)

The 1945/46 elections confirmed the emergence of a ‘Muslim’ against a ‘non-Muslim’ vote block. Communal polarisation operated at all social levels. Everywhere, “sporadic but very striking” manifestations of anti-British unity were being rivalled and successively eclipsed by the rise of communal violence on a novel scale from mid-1946 onwards. (51)

1. Saad, Jinnah Reinterpreted, 360.

2. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 48

3. Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan 2:335.

4. Ibid., 336

5. Sarkar, Modern India, 375

6. Party Organizer, March 1941, CPIL-AB

7. Dutt,” Notes of the Month,” Labour Monthly, September 1941.

8. Fight Anarchy Rally the People, WBIB File 854/36 SL 213/1936, 132

9. Mitra, Indian Annual Register, vol. 22/2, 1940 Shibpur: Annual Register Office 1940), 415

10. Party Letter, October 5, 1941, CPIL-AB.

11. Ibid.

12. Ganghadar Adhikari, “National Unity Now,” People’s War, August 8, 1942.

13. P. C. Joshi, The Indian Communist Party. Its Policy and Work in the War of Liberation, PCJ 1942/29-A, 16, 27

14. Adhikari, “National Unity Now,” People’s War, August 8, 1942

15. Ibid.

16. Labor Monthly, March 1943, pp. 87-91.

17. Adhikari, Pakistan and Indian National Unity. With a Foreword by Ben Bradley (London: Labour Monthly 1942), 16.

18.Ibid., 9–10

19.Ibid., 463.

20. “Report by G. Adhikari,” 472–3

21. Ibid., 12.

22. Ibid

23. Gupta, Communism and Nationalism, 241.

24. Zaheer, A Case for Congress League Unity (Bombay: People’s Publishing House 1944), I

25. Bipan Chandra, “P. C. Joshi: A Political Journey,” Mainstream 46, no. 1 (2007): 2–3

26. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart 1971), 235–9

27. Adhikari, Pakistan and Indian National Unity, 22, 27

28. Zaheer, “Muslim League and Indian Freedom,” People’s War, January 23, 1944

29. Ibid.

30. People’s War, November 7, 1943

31. All-India Muslim League Secretary Wishes Success To The Communist Party,” People’s War, July 4, 1943

32. All-India Muslim League Secretary Wishes Success To The Communist Party,” People’s War, July 4, 1943

33. Ghate (interviewee), 214 Party Letter, November 27, 1943, 1, CPIL-AB.

34. Joshi, “They Must Not Fail,” People’s War, August 20,1944.

35. Communist Survey—July-October, 1943, WBIB File 573/37 SL 140/1937, 255.

36. Eid Mubarak, People’s War, September 17, 1944.

37. “Pakistan Day Reports,” People’s War, March 26, 1944.

38. A Note on the Punjab Communist Party and Its Allied Bodies from April, 1944 to March, 1945, Home/Poll/1945 Nr. 7/I & K.W., 14

39.Home/Poll/1946 Nr. 5/40, 2, 15.

40. EMS Namboodiripad, Ahwanavum Thakkeethum (“Call and the Warning,”) Home/Poll/1946 Nr. 5/40, 17–18

41. Joshi, “For the Final Bid for Power,” 147–8.

42. “Ahrars Join Up with Huque,” People’s War, April 23, 1944

43. Girish Mathur, “Pan-Islam Bogey, Who Raises It?,” People’s War, November 5, 1944.

44. Madhusree Mukerjee, Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II (New York: Basic Books 2010).

45. Ranadive, “Notes,” People’s War, September 19, 1943, 2.

46. Rajani Palme Dutt, “India and Pakistan,” Labour Monthly 28/March (1946): 86

47. Dutt, “India and Pakistan,” 87–9.

48. On Palme Dutt’s Article ‘India and Pakistan‘ in the LABOR MONTHLY, March 1946,” in Party Letter, May 12, 1946

49. Rajani Palme Dutt, “A New Chapter in Divide and Rule,” in Documents 5:246

50. Rajani Palme Dutt, Freedom for India: The Truth about the Cabinet Mission’s Visit, PCJ 1946/1, 16.

51. Sarkar, Modern India, 426–7.

Courtesy – Hamlet in Monsoon )

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