How communists colored our textbooks “RED”
![](https://kreately.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/IMG_20201223_143538__01-3-1509x2048-1.jpg)
24th January 1966: Shashtriji is found dead in his room at USSR. Congress has to decide the next PM. The Congress Syndicate(Group of leaders consisting of Morarji, Nijlingpaa, Kamraj etc) did not want to have Morarji Desai as PM who was thought to have a very high stature, but chose a “ghoongi gudiya(dumb dolly)” whom they can easily manipulate. Little did they know, this decision was going to bite them back.
Indira Gandhi is now the PM. But there were constant clashes between Indiraji and the syndicate. The situation comes to head when the President Dr. Zakir Hussain expired in 1969. Congress put up Neelam Sanjiva Reddy as Presidential candidate where as Indiraji supported V.V.Giri, an independent candidate. And V.V.Giri won! This resulted a split in Congress. Syndicate formed Congress(O) where as Indiraji’s faction was called Congress(R).
Congress(R) now became 45 MPs short of majority in loksabha. And here enters the Communist Party of India (CPI). The govt survives on left support. The left did not ask for ministries or alluring posts, their agenda was much more well thought. They started their agenda of “red-washing” the brains.
The left stood by Indiraji during all her difficult times i.e. when she abolished privy purses, nationalized the banks/coal mines, reformed bureaucracy etc. With so many enemies(including Supreme Court) trying to corner her, Indiraji did not want to leave a “true friend” and did what Left wanted :– “Indiraji manages politics and left manages peoples’ brains“. And hence from around this time onwards, all intellectual space was taken over by left.
They took the below steps:
In nutshell, I can say that Left in a very systematic manner captured the brain of the country. With left political influence dwindling, things have become better. But it is imperative that Indians never let the left gain political power in India and breach their last remaining bastion in Kerala.
DISCLAIMER: The author is solely responsible for the views expressed in this article. The author carries the responsibility for citing and/or licensing of images utilized within the text.
1 Comment
You must be logged in to post a comment.
The below is the article published on 27 March in The Wire. This article is an excellent example on how to wage information warfare. Various elements and tactics used in Information warfare can be found in this article. Let us understand this a bit.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a statement on March 26 – at the 50th National Day Celebration of Bangladesh, where he was an invited guest – asserting that he had been jailed in 1971 for his participation in a ‘satyagraha’ with friends in support of the independence of Bangladesh.
While this assertion was greeted with both derision as well as admiration, depending on how one retrospectively views the political capacities of the 21-year-old Narendra Modi, it may be worthwhile to look at the events of 1971 more closely, to scrutinize Modi’s attempts to insert himself into the history of struggle for Bangladesh. (The author has cleverly concluded that Modi is wrongly trying to insert himself in history of struggle for Bangladesh, this is correct way of presenting your conclusion before you actually present proof when waging information warfare. In the above paragraph we understand the objective of the writer/the Wire. They see Modi’s statment as an attempt to insert himself in the history of the struggle of Bangladesh. There are multiple elements in this paragraph, first, writer has already drawn a conclusion, obviously writer has no intention of being objective. This is also equivalent to preaching to the choir since the existing audience does not have to read the article as they have been told what they should see this as.)
The ‘Independence of Bangladesh’ had been announced on ‘Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra / Radio Centre’ from Kalurghat Radio Station in Chittagong by then Major Zia ur Rahman on March 27, 1971. (This information has no direct relevance as far as statement made by Modi is concerned, This is a good way to present facts which are not relevant to the issue at hand and do not in any way prove that Modi is lying. Consequently this also helps take the reader in a different direction altogether.)
This followed the declaration of martial law in East Pakistan in the wake of widespread disaffection arising from the annulment of the results of Pakistan’s 1970 general election, which saw the mainly East Pakistan-based Awami League win a majority. (The above paragraph is a case of oversimplification of the ground reality. Since the Wire wants to downplay the crimes of their patron, “Pakistan”, they are presenting a sanitized piece of information which also helps take the reader in a different direction. A sort of Red Herring.)
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had already been arrested in Dhaka on the midnight between March 24 and March 25, 1971 and flown to prison in Rawalpindi, West Pakistan on April .
Operation Searchlight, the Pakistan Army’s mass killings to ‘clean up’ East Pakistan of opposition began on March 25. (look how cleverly author has whitewashed the genocide/murder/rape and instead used the phrase “cleaning up the opposition”, this is a brilliant example of how to completely whitewash the horrendous crimes committed and paint a completely harmless image of Pakistan Army. The author is adept at waging information warfare.
The killings on that day included the massacre of a very large number of East Bengali intellectuals and academics, including those of Dhaka University. (another brilliant example, instead of using the exact or rough statistics, the phrase – “very large number” is used, anyone reading this for the first time might think not much damage happened) the phrase East Bengali intellectuals is another brilliant example since it totally ignores the identity, Hindu, Women, Innocent human beings and the focus is on intellectuals only thus conveying that a narrow band of individuals were victims).
(The above is a heavily sanitized version of events. Please note that the description is missing crucial information like murders, rapes, minorities like Hindus, genocide, root cause of the hatred towards Bengalis specially Hindus prevalent among Pakistan Sunni Muslims of the day, total casualties and many more details. This is a classic case of massive downplaying of facts and ground reality of the time).
Indira Gandhi, India’s prime minister at the time, moved a resolution in parliament drafted by her principal secretary, P.N. Haksar. The resolution said that the Indian parliament expressed ‘whole hearted sympathy and support for the people of East Bengal’. Sensitive to the flux of international realpolitik, the resolution stopped short of endorsing the ‘declaration of independence of Bangladesh’ that had been made in the radio announcement by Zia Ur Rahman just four days before. (The information in this paragraph is not directly relevant to the statement made by Modi, this is called padding. The above paragraph inserts names of stakeholders, events and some links which when clicked will take you to a site which presents information which is also heavily sanitized and for obvious reasons excludes any reference of what Modi is talking about making it irrelevant.)
Mrs. Gandhi had already had a meeting with the principal opposition leaders on March 26, 1971 where she had discussed the limited options available to the Indian government. She told the opposition leaders that whatever steps may be contemplated by the Indian government in response to the escalating situation in East Pakistan should not be a matter of public debate – as that would ‘defeat the purpose of giving such comfort as we can to democratic forces in Pakistan as a whole’. She pointed out that Pakistan was a sovereign member of the United Nations, and that the taking of immediate and precipitate steps by India would be unlikely to find favour, or support, internationally. (The author is presenting a Pakistan as a “democratic force” )
The Indian government’s authorized ‘Official History of the 1971 War’ has many details of the turbulence in the Indian political and government scene with regard to the question of conferring immediate recognition to the ‘independence of Bangladesh’. (it is convenient because the official history written by congress and its acolytes completely erase all events which are not convenient)
Events moved quickly after the last week of March, 1971.
Tajuddin Ahmed, the senior East Bengali opposition leader who would go on to be the acting head of the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, met Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on April 3, 1971. He was promised all help. The ground work for this meeting had been done by among others, Ashok Mitra, (then economic adviser to the Prime Minister, later CPI(M) minister in West Bengal), Amartya Sen (then Professor at Delhi School of Economics), P.N. Haksar (principal secretary to the prime minister) and two East Bengali economists, Anisur Rehman and Rahman Sobhan, both personally knowns to Mitra and Sen, who had somehow managed to escape to Delhi from Dhaka. (Note how the author uses the words – adviser to PM, later CPI(M), amazing word play, trying to give credit to communists. also, how is meeting between Tajuddin with Indira Gandhi relevant, this is how you construct a irrelevant fact and then build on it.)
(In the above paragraph the writer mentions names who should be given credit namely the communists. Look at the construction of the sentence – Ashok Mitra, (then economic adviser to the Prime Minister, later CPI(M) minister in West Bengal). This is how you give credit to Communist while carefully skirting the topic of Modi’s statement).
Also, in April 1971, General, later Field Marshall ‘Sam’ Maneckshaw, then Indian Army chief, bluntly told Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the Indian army was not prepared to enter a war immediately and that he needed a few months’ time. Mrs. Gandhi, who was of a similar view herself, took his advice and played for time. (This information is not relevant and author is basically following through on the first attempt to mislead the reader, another example on how to present a fact which is not relevant and then continue to build up your case)
Meanwhile, the ‘Provisional Government of Bangladesh’ was declared in the town of Baidynathtola (renamed Mujibnagar) in East Pakistan on April 10, 1971.
The names of the members of the ‘cabinet’ of this provisional government were declared on April 17. They relocated shortly after to Calcutta, in India, where they operated from a building on 8, Theatre Road (now Shakespeare Sarani).
The Indian Government delayed conferring ‘formal recognition’ to the Provisional Government of Bangladesh as that would be considered an ‘act of war’ by Pakistan. At that time, in the event of war being declared, Pakistan had the promise of support of the United States and China.
To sum up, the Government of India did not confer formal recognition to the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, because it wanted to (a) buy time to make proper war plans, (as suggested by Maneckshaw) and b) insulate Mujibur Rahman, then imprisoned in West Pakistan, from treason charges and the execution of a death sentence, which would immediately follow such charges. Nevertheless, it allowed the Provisional Government of Bangladesh to operate under its protection from Calcutta. It also hosted the roughly six million East Bengali refugees, including Mukti Bahini fighters, who fled into West Bengal in India after Operation Searchlight began.
However, Indian Intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces and finally the Indian Army began aiding and supplying East Bengali Mukti Bahini fighters, first informally (mainly Border Security Force) from March 1971, and then with some formality, with the Eastern Command of the Indian Army operationalising Operation Jackpot, from May 1971 onwards, thereby laying the ground for joint operations between Indian army soldiers acting without uniforms and Mukti Bahini irregulars.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi traveled the world to try and build up the case for Bangladesh, in support of Indian intervention, and against Pakistan.
The first significant diplomatic dividend of this effort was the securing of the India-USSR treaty of Friendship, which committed the USSR to supporting India in the event of India being dragged into war. This was a major guarantee for the success of the build-up of the Indian war effort. (so the author accepts that India-USSR treaty of Friendship was a positive development, so why would Vajpayee oppose it, without understanding the background and context in which an individual or a group initially opposed this treaty the author has tried to conclude that opposition parties in India were against or opposing this treaty. also note the way author is more specific when the information suits a certain narrative and more ambiguous when it does not)
The US was determined to push the region into war early, as that would have been to its strategic ally Pakistan’s advantage. The CIA used its clients in India (which included a mole inside Mrs. Gandhi’s cabinet) to try and muster a consensus around the position that the India-USSR treaty was a betrayal of Bangladesh as the USSR would not allow India to ‘recognise’ Bangladesh. This was faithfully reported in cables from the CIA station in Delhi to superiors in Washington and Langley. In all probability the CIA station was telling the mole what to say, and then reporting what the mole said, as an index of its penetration into the uppermost echelon of power in India at the time.
Curiously, this position – that the India-USSR Treaty was a ‘betrayal’ of the ‘Bangladesh Cause’ – was also the line taken by the Right Wing opposition party, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, parent of today’s Bharatiya Janata Party. This may be readily gleaned from two Jana Sangh documents, ‘Recognise Swadhin Bangladesh’ (July 2, 1971) and ‘Indo-Soviet Treaty, August 13, 1971, Delhi, Central Working Committee,’ both, cited by Rahul Sagar in his 2019 essay, ‘Hindu Nationalism and the Cold War’.
The Jan Sangh, the RSS, and its leaders, particularly Atal Bihari Vajpayee, were pushing publicly, and in parliament, for an early commencement of hostilities. They either did not know, or pretended not to know that this would do immense harm to the armed struggle being waged within East Pakistan, with covert Indian military support, by the Mukti Bahini, as it would immediately draw the US and China into direct support for Pakistan.
The notion that the Jan Sangh and Vajpayee, were naive and did not understand the implications of what they were doing is the generous explanation. Less charitable explanations could also be offered.
And so, a ‘Recognise Bangladesh Satyagraha’ of August 1 – 11th, 1971 undertaken by the Jan Sangh in Delhi, which culminated in a rally to protest against the India-USSR Treaty of Friendship which had been signed three days earlier, on August 9, 1971 was a set of moves that sought to jump the gun on Bangladesh. It’s primary objective was to agitate for war, despite the lack of preparation, and also to steer public opinion against the Indo- Soviet Treaty – which the Jan Sangh wanted to prove was a ‘betrayal of Bangladesh’. The Times of India reported at the time that Vajpayee spoke at a massive rally in Delhi on August 12, 1971 and said that the Indo-Soviet treaty implied ‘a conspiracy between Delhi and Moscow to deny recognition to Bangladesh’.
The statement of Vajpayee should be seen on appropriate context/background, but since no references have been given or shared by author it ends up confusing and misleading the general public which is another method used by someone waging information warfare.
This is the ‘Satyagraha’ which Narendra Modi is claiming to have participated in. He has spoken about this in an earlier trip to Bangladesh as well – when he went to receive Bangladesh’s highest civilian award on behalf of the ailing Atal Behari Vaipayee (the citation of this award also refers to the Jan Sangh Satyagraha of August 1971.
It is also being being claimed that Modi actually wrote this in Sangharsh Maa Gujarat, a book published in 1978. However, native Gujarati speakers who have read the 2000 edition of the book (available as a PDF on Modi’s web page report that the book makes no mention of this, even though ‘imprisonment in Tihar Jail due to participation in Bangladesh Satyagraha’ is mentioned, in passing, as part of the then young author’s ‘achievements’ in the short author’s bio note printed on the back cover.
What is curious is the coincidence of the Jan Sangh’s position with that of the ‘mole’ in Mrs. Gandhi’s cabinet in 1971 – the bogus suggestion that the Indo-Soviet treaty would make it harder for India to recognise Bangladesh.
Modi, a young man of 21 in 1971, may or may not have then had the delusions of grandeur that he certainly has now. It is hard to say whether or not his possible involvement in this ‘Satyagraha’ of August 1971 and the undertaking of the hallowed Indian ritual of ‘courting arrest’ was impelled by an overflowing of emotions in favour of the emancipation of East Bengal. What is certain is that the protest he was part of was furthering a demand that would have weakened India’s ability to wage war later that year for the liberation of Bangladesh.
Modi was 21 – irrelevant, delusions of grandeur – assumption/character assasination
If you see the language used for Bhagat Singh or Disha Toolkit you would understand the stark difference not to mention the condescending attitide and negative predisposition and the malicious garnishing which is typical when trying to portray a character in negative light instead of doing objetcive assessment. There is more than a hint of sarcasm.
Had India entered the war with a US-and-China-backed-Pakistan prematurely, even as late as August 1971, instead of in December 1971, as the Jan Sangh wanted it to, it is quite possible that Pakistan would have prevailed and that Bangladesh would not have attained actual independence in December. So when Modi says that he acted to support Bangladesh’s independence when he was 21 years old, perhaps he is letting his imagination get the better of reality. But we have come to expect that of him, anyways, by now.
In the above paragraph author is assuming that Jan Sangh wanted to start hostilities on a particular date or month. The actual action was taken by Indira Gandhi after discussion with relevant stakeholders and therefore the assumption is unwarranted.
There is also a false equivalence between Jan Sangh and Modi. This is a classic case of a statement that tries to deny the individuality of Modi and clubs together Jan Sangh for convenience.