It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added, in the world. The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, it’s great trading harbours, its reserve of military strength, supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment’s notice upon any point either of Asia or Africa— all these are assets of precious value. On the west, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan ; on the north it can veto any rival in Tibet ; on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam. On the high sees it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas.

In an address he made during the inaugural session of the Philosophical Institute of Edinburgh, George Curzon, the former Viceroy of British India on 19 October 1909, these were the words used by George Curzon, the retired Viceroy of British India. In this context, one needs to note that India doesn’t mean current geographical India but including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Aden.

His lecture starts as a lament for not recognising India’s importance in the grander scheme of things and slowly moves on to what British did for India and how they are supposed to treat India. In fact, he notes that the contemporary assessment is that India is treated indifferently, but reverently like a magnificent jewel in the imperial collar and which can be detached from the collar making no difference to the overall picture.

Hitherto there has been a tendency to treat India as lying somewhat outside the main congeries of States and communities that compose that Empire ; to regard it, so to speak, as a magnificent jewelled pendant hanging from the Imperial collar, but capable of being detached therefrom without making any particular difference to its symmetry or strength.

However, while he highlights the British indifference on one side, he also talks about the criticality of India to the British Empire – a trait which British tend to ignore.

Apart from the obscurity naturally attaching to a country so unlike our own and so remote, to which Englishmen only proceed as officials or merchants for a term of years, rarely if ever making it their permanent home, and where the entire framework of existence is almost the antipodes of British ideas, it must be remembered that the conception of Empire as a vast organism resting upon the theory of voluntary incorporation, and capable of developing a sense of common duty and self-sacrifice, is essentially a modern invention, springing from the tie of common origin and cemented by loyalty to a common inheritance.

In such a conception India would not easily or prima facie find a part, and thus it is that in all the talk of Imperial Federation India has been treated too much as a dependency, impressive and potent, it is true, but lacking any distinct volition of her own, and destined to be fitted into the scheme more or less according to the pleasure of her British masters. It is to show you that this is a false and may be a disastrous view, and to bring home to you that India is not only in important part of any Imperial organization in the future, but so important that without her the Empire would not continue to exist…

Consider in the first place what a part India has played in the shaping of British policy and the expansion of the British dominion. It has been the determining influence in every considerable movement of British power to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The Eastern question of the Middle Ages was merely the recovery of the Holy Places from infidel hands. But once we had planted ourselves m India, the Eastern question, though it revolved round Constantinople, was in reality directed by considerations of the security of our Indian possessions. But for India, Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the shares in the Suez Canal ; and but for the Suez Canal, we should not now be in Egypt. The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. Had it not been for India, we should never have seized the Cape or begun that career of South African expansion that has lately entered upon so remarkable and pregnant a phase. But for India, we should not have been able to incarcerate the mighty spirit of Napoleon in the rocky prison of St Helena; Mauritius would not now be ours ; nor should we have acquired a predominant position in Mesopotamia, or have controlled the Persian Gulf. India compelled us to lay hold of Aden, a position of incomparable importance, and to establish a protectorate over the neighbouring parts of Arabia. India started us on that career of territorial conquest which was only arrested by the snowy ramparts of the Himalayas, and which converted us from a small island with trading and maritime interests into the greatest land Power of the world. It was through India that we established those connections with the Straits Settlements (formerly under the rule of the Governor-General of India), and with China and Japan, that were the foundation of our once unchallenged and still powerful position in the Far East. India took us to the foolishly-surrendered possession of Java.

The crux of the argument comes then, what a good friend of mine called Curzon Doctrine.

It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added, in the world. The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, it’s great trading harbours, its reserve of military strength, supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment’s notice upon any point either of Asia or Africa— all these are assets of precious value. On the west, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan ; on the north it can veto any rival in Tibet ; on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam. On the high sees it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas.

The subsequent parts are also relevant and echo the situation in the current world.

Consider what would happen were we to lose India, and were some other Power to take our place, for it is inconceivable that India could stand or would be left alone. We should lose its splendid and unfailing markets, shut against us by hostile tariffs ; we should lose what I shall presently show is the principal, indeed almost the only, formidable element in our fighting strength ; our influence in Asia would quickly disappear; we should not long retain the posts and coaling-stations which dot the ocean highways with the British flag ; Australia would be much more open to attack; our colonies would cut themselves off from a dying trunk ; and we should sink into a third-rate Power, an object of shame to ourselves and of derision to the rest of mankind.

As early as 1909, we would see that Curzon recognize that India is not a local power. It has got the capability and resources to become a global one.

Remember, too, that India is no longer a piece, even a king or a queen, on the Asiatic chessboard only. It is a royal piece on the chessboard of international politics. If we were indifferent to it ourselves, or were disposed to think, in the cant of modern indifferentism, that it does not much matter, there are other Powers quite ready to remind us that such is not the case.

The rest of the lecture deals with what the British did to India and how they should behave with regard to India and is of little contemporary significance. The fundamental focus should be on the below lines, what one may call as Curzon Doctrine over how India should behave.

The crux of this is that India should be the paramount power in the territory bounded by and including Red Sea Asian Coast, Iran, Afghanistan, Tibet and Malay Peninsula and should be in a position to interfere everywhere in the Indian Ocean Region – it’s no more a local power but has got global significance. It’s geographical location, it’s size and resources mean that it has a right to claim it’s place on the high table and not beseech others to give it a place. One need to note that these borders are bounded by the political realities of 1909 – with Czarist Russia extending till Afghanistan and Ottoman Empire controlling Saudi Arabia, the French holding Indo-China and the Dutch, Indonesia. Should India’s influence extend beyond Curzon’s borders? Or what should constitute India’s sphere of influence in Africa? Policy Makers should tell. But, the whole of African Coast till Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, Indo-China and the Central Asian Turkic Republics into Indian sphere of influence – they make logical sense.

A keen observer would have noticed this in all history and with India traditionally controlling sea access to half of the old world on one side and geographically located in a way to interfere everywhere in Indian Ocean extending to Champa Sea and Australia, one should be surprised if India didn’t use that power to become the master of the region.

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